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  This paper presents an empirical study to find out the possible barriers on implementing 
operational audit. The proposed study distributes some questionnaires among supreme audit 
court of auditors and analyzes the questions. The results indicate that many governmental 
organizations are not strongly committed to rules and regulations. There are not sufficient 
standards on auditing programs and many governmental agencies do not even use operational 
budgeting system since they are not aware of the benefits of such system. There are some of the 
most important challenges of having operational accounting and paper suggests some 
guidelines for having better regulation on removing the main barriers. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Operational auditing plays an important role on many big institutions where several transactions held 
on a daily basis. Operational auditing is not just providing consultation, but the skill sets of an 
experienced operational auditor. Internal auditors regularly evaluate controls and impact 
organizational units well beyond the financial reporting. Their expertise, disciplined approach to 
evaluating controls brings real value for their organizations. During the past few years, there have 
been changes on definitions of various terms of auditing. Internal Auditing, for instance, has been 
redefined, operational auditing, a comprehensive method used among professional organizations, is 
undergoing a transformation from a very broadly defined to a highly focused assessment of 
organization risk, capability and performance.  Traditional audit steps such as preliminary surveys 
have been replaced by collaborative risk assessment.  Audits of organizational functions using 
standardized checklists have also been replaced by cross functional teams using some modern 
management tools from quality management and process reengineering.    758
There is no doubt that operational auditing could significantly affect the performance of any 
organization and there are many evidences to believe that operational auditing could reduce many 
possible feudal transactions. An efficient auditing program normally reduces different risk associated 
with inspections of various accounts (Lines & Nicholson, 1994). Efficient operational auditing 
normally depends on a good organizational structure, where authority and responsibility for all phases 
of operations are precisely defined. A good and comprehensive auditory system usually represents on 
time process of transactions, which could contribute to all operations and helps organizations for a 
sustainable growth. There are literally many studies associated with challenges on having good 
auditing plans (Abidin et al., 2010).   
Blume and Voigt (2011) are believed to be the first who assessed the economic factors of differences 
in organizational design of supreme audit institutions (SAIs) on a cross-country basis. They estimated 
the influences on three groups of economic variables including fiscal policy, government 
effectiveness and corruption, and productivity. The study gathered data from 40 countries and 
reported that differences in the independence, the implementation record, the mandate and the 
organizational model of the SAIs would not seem to have any clear-cut effect on any of the three 
groups of dependent variables. However, they reported an exception, which was perceived levels of 
corruption and they were substantially higher if the SAI were structured along the court model of 
auditing. 
Schelker and Eichenberger (2010) investigated the role of independent auditing institutions with an 
extended mandate to audit the budget draft and individual policy proposals. They argued that such 
auditors could improve transparency and prepare essential information on the effect of policy 
proposals on common pool resources, which helps reduce unnecessary expenditures. They 
empirically investigated the effect of such auditors on fiscal policy at the Swiss local level. In fact, 
those auditors who could assess and criticize policy proposals substantially reduce the general tax 
burden and public expenditures. The results were similar for various datasets and robust to different 
changes in the econometric specification. 
Jennings et al. (2008) reported the results of an empirical survey in which 57 sitting United States 
judges took part in a behavioral experiment to evaluate the credibility of the financial reporting 
process and the legal risk auditors bear under conditions where they provided an internal control audit 
report (vs. no report) under two corporate governance environments. They reported that internal 
control audits could provide enhanced assurance that intentional misstatements do not exist. They 
also explained how to present elevated protection to the public.  
Chung et al. (2010) compared the status of auditors’ legal liability to third parties in 7 countries. They 
investigated recent regulation, legislation, and case law as well as pronouncements from national 
accounting and auditing bodies. They reported that common law countries including the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand had enacted legislative reforms, 
which directly or indirectly increased auditors’ liability. In contrast, civil law countries such as 
Germany and France did not mandate legislative or regulatory reforms. 
Radcliffe (2008) investigated government auditing observations regarding the “public secret”, or 
“knowing what not to know” with the concept of analysis as defacement. Radcliffe explored the 
consequences of auditors in effect keeping public secrets, based on the findings of a performance 
audit of the Cleveland (Ohio) City Public Schools as an exemplar. 
Giroux and Cassell (2011) investigated the changing patterns in the economic and institutional risk 
environment during the past few years and studied differences using empirical surrogates as measures 
of relative audit risk. They investigated competitive, economic, and regulatory differences over time. 
They reported cyclical patterns of relative audit risk, which were parallel regulatory, economic and 
institutional changes over the period. G. Haidarinejad / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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Numata and Takeda (2010) investigated the effect of accounting fraud by Kanebo and the resulting 
penalties on Kanebo and its auditor, ChuoAoyama, on the stock prices of clients of ChuoAoyama and 
the other Big four auditors in Japan. They study provided an opportunity to examine whether loss of 
an auditors' reputation matters without an insurance rationale. They reported that the announcements 
of poor audit quality had substantially decreased the stock prices of clients of ChuoAoyama and, to a 
lesser extent, stock prices of the clients of the other Big 4 auditors. 
Guénin-Paracini and Gendron (2010) preformed a comprehensive auditing study and explained that 
the functioning and the sustaining of economic order are predicated on the production and 
reproduction of mythologies and not just by rationality of market. Lima and Magrini (2010) 
investigated the Brazilian audit Tribunal's role in improving the federal environmental licensing 
process. 
The present study investigates why many Iranian governmental agencies fail to use operational 
accounting. On the contrary to many other studies, we only focus on gathering insights from top 
managers who work for supreme audit court.  The orientation of this work first presents details of our 
survey in section 2. Section 3 presents details of our finding and finally concluding remarks are given 
in the last to summarize the contribution of the paper. 
2. The proposed study 
The proposed study investigates the main challenges on having efficient operational budgeting 
planning in governmental agencies. The study uses the following formula to calculate the minimum 
number of sample size, 
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where  N  is the population size,  q p − =1 represents the yes/no categories,  2 / α z is CDF of normal 
distribution and finally ε is the error term. Since we have  96 . 1 , 5 . 0 2 / = = α z p and N=500, the number 
of sample size is calculated as n=375. In our survey, we selected 190 regular auditors, 127 senior 
auditors, 111 chief auditors, 55 senior chief auditors. There were also 17 top managers who helped us 
by filling the questionnaires. There are four hypotheses associated with the proposed study of this 
paper, which are as follows, 
1.  The lack of legitimate law based on the main components of operational auditing including 
economic, efficient and effectiveness methods is considered as one of the main challenges of 
using such operational auditing.  
2.  The lack of a good and practical standard is considered as one of the main challenges of using 
operational auditing among executive managers.  
3.  When there is no operational budgeting, there will be no motivation on executing operational 
auditing among executive managers.  
4.  The lack of a good awareness is one of the main barriers of using operational auditing among 
different people including executive managers.   
The questionnaire has been designed using Likert scale (Likert, 1932) and Cronbach Alpha 
(Cronbach, 1951) was calculated as 0.85, which validated the results. Next we present the results of 
our survey using Chi-Square test.  
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3. The results 
To complete the survey, we have used Chi-Square test to examine the tests and Table 1 shows details 
of our finding.  
Table 1 
The results of Chi-Square for four hypotheses 
Hypothesis Explanation   
2 χ   Critical region  Null hypothesis 
H1  The lack of a good regulation on forcing 
firms to provide operational auditing 
629.82 21.0265  Reject 
H2  The lack of sufficient standards to 
support operational auditing 
462.59 21.0261 Reject 
H3  The lack of existence of operational 
budgeting in organization  
673.49 21.0261  Reject 
H4  The lack of a good awareness of the 
advantages of operational auditing in 
organizations  
129.17 21.0261 Reject 
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 1, all null hypotheses have been rejected in favor of 
alternative ones but we need to also rank all these hypotheses for possible future action and use 
Freedman test (Friedman, 1937-1940) to rank them. Fig. 1 shows details of our ranking. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The results of Freedman test 
As we can observe from the results of Fig. 1, the lack of a good regulation on forcing firms to provide 
operational auditing is the most important item challenging operational auditing. The lack of 
sufficient standards to support operational auditing is the second most important reason to use 
operational auditing. Our Freedman test result also confirms that when there is no operational 
budgeting, there will be no motivation on executing operational auditing among executive managers. 
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In Iran, many governmental agencies do not presently have any operational auditing and this itself 
could create some challenges. Finally, the lack of a good awareness of the advantages of operational 
auditing in organizations is the last important item on using operational auditing.  
We could suggest that local government of Iran setup some regulation to force governmental agencies 
and organizations to start using operational auditing systems. The regulations normally must go to 
Parliament and details of the regulations must be discussed and approved before any other actions are 
taken. Presently, there is no transparent standard for operational auditing in Iran and it is not easy to 
adopt traditional existing standard.  
The author believes that supreme audit court of auditors must act as initiatives to start setting up some 
new regulations. The government must insist on using operational auditing in the country and create 
some motivations for different agencies to develop these regulations. Finally, it is very unfortunate to 
see that many top managers of governmental agencies are not familiar with the basic concept of 
operational auditing. Therefore, we need to encourage them to participate managers in some short 
courses or MBA programs to become familiar with fundamentals of these issues. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented an empirical study to discover the possible barriers on implementing 
operational audit. The proposed study distributed some questionnaires among supreme audit court of 
auditors and analyzed the questions. The results indicated that many governmental organizations were 
not strongly committed to rules and regulations. In addition, when there was no operational 
budgeting, there would be no motivation on executing operational auditing among executive 
managers. There were not sufficient standards on auditing programs and many governmental agencies 
do not even use operational auditing system since they were not aware of the benefits of such system. 
There are some of the most important challenges of having operational auditing and paper suggests 
some guidelines for having better regulation on removing the main barriers.  
We have suggested that local government of Iran setup some regulations to force governmental 
agencies and organizations to start using operational auditing systems. The author believes that 
supreme audit court of auditors must act as initiatives to start setting up some new regulations. The 
government must emphasis on using operational auditing in the country and it must create some 
motivations for different agencies to develop these regulations. Finally, it is very unfortunate to see 
that many top managers of governmental agencies are not familiar with the basic concept of 
operational auditing. Therefore, we need to encourage managers to participate in some short courses 
or MBA programs to become familiar with fundamentals of these issues. 
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